The First Rule of Evangelization

As I wrote a few days ago in a Patheos column, the first rule of evangelization: don't be a jackass [http://www.patheos.com/blogs/beyondalltelling/2018/05/the-empire-of-the-dove-part-i/#].

An excellent apologist helpfully pressed me on the point. I'm going to post a revision of my reply here, but what occasions this is the grotesque spectacle of Catholics running down the Pope on hearsay, these critics making clear that whatever sins they grapple with, they can't be as bad as homosexual activity. Jackassery.

We do in fact have some hard truths to say to the world, but we cannot say them with credibility until we become more saintly, more obviously committed to universal reconciliation, more obviously embodying the preemptive, unilateral, and asymmetrical love of the Spirit-filled follower of the Crucified. It is jackassery to give the impression that homosexual activity is some extreme moral horror, when we do not welcome refugees, when we calumniate and detract in our gossip, when we live in bourgeois bubbles insouciant to the precarious conditions of those hard-pressed in life, when we rashly judge others from the standpoint of a justified pharisee—all sins weightier than sexual sin; it is jackassery when we refuse to countenance reasons behind differing political positions, behaving savagely in online conversations in the name of Christianity; it is jackassery to advocate publicly for the integrity of marriage, when we say not a word about domestic abuse, when we don't do a thing to press for reconciliation in marriages falling apart right before our eyes, when we allow those washed out of marriages to wither away in social isolation; it is at least jackassery (if not straight up psychosis) to think that evangelization essentially involves telling the world that most people go to hell.

Why the True Religion Needs Critical Theory

Christians have much to learn from the Frankfurt School of critical social theory. Pope Benedict makes this clear in his encyclical Spe salvi [Saved in Hope]:

"A world which has to create its own justice is a world without hope. No one and nothing can answer for centuries of suffering. No one and nothing can guarantee that the cynicism of power—whatever beguiling ideological mask it adopts—will cease to dominate the world. This is why the great thinkers of the Frankfurt School, Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, were equally critical of atheism and theism. Horkheimer radically excluded the possibility of ever finding a this-worldly substitute for God, while at the same time he rejected the image of a good and just God. In an extreme radicalization of the Old Testament prohibition of images, he speaks of a 'longing for the totally Other' that remains inaccessible—a cry of yearning directed at world history. Adorno also firmly upheld this total rejection of images, which naturally meant the exclusion of any 'image' of a loving God. But as this dialectic is always 'negative,' he highlighted and asserted that justice—true justice—would require a world 'where not only present suffering would be wiped out, but also that which is irrevocably past would be undone.' This would mean, however—to express it with positive and hence, for him, inadequate symbols—that there can be no justice without a resurrection of the dead."

The Frankfurt School relentlessly demystified the bloody pretensions of hegemonic materialist and technocratic progressivism. So consistent in their negation of every position in favor of those who are the crushed humus beneath the pyramids of power, the critical theorists open a way for the true transcendence of total kenotic love to interrupt the false totalities of irreligion and crypto-secular religion:

"Christians likewise can and must constantly learn from the strict rejection of images that is contained in God's first commandment. The truth of negative theology was highlighted by the Fourth Lateran Council, which explicitly stated that however great the similarity that may be established between Creator and creature, the dissimilarity between them is always greater."

Citing a dogma central to his friend Hans Urs von Balthasar's systematics, Pope Benedict reminds us that the only non-idolatrous theism is one of the ever-greater God, Who has opted for a totality without closure in the analogy of being, in which there is no upper limit for the energies of existence.

So. No to the idolatries within religion. But no also to the other secularism: the one that dooms us to a totality of power. There is a measureless measure. There is true judgment. Not in us. Rather: above us; below us; all through us. The Word made flesh, the tortured God, the Faithful and True, embraces within His stretched sinews everything there is in heaven, on earth, and under the earth.

"In any case, for the believer the rejection of images cannot be carried so far that one ends up, as Horkheimer and Adorno would like, by saying 'no' to both theses—theism and atheism."

In a thoroughly Balthasarian passage, the Pope points out the true negative theology—the absolute identification of God with the anguished human:

"God has given Himself an 'image': in Christ Who was made man. In Him Who was crucified, the denial of false images of God is taken to an extreme. God now reveals His true face in the figure of the sufferer who shares man's God-forsaken condition by taking it upon Himself. This innocent sufferer has attained the certitude of hope: there is a God, and God can create justice in a way that we cannot conceive, yet we can begin to grasp it through faith. Yes, there is a resurrection of the flesh. There is justice. There is an 'undoing' of past suffering, a reparation that sets things aright."

It is the faith OF Jesus, God the Son, above all in His abandonment by His Father, that is the hinge of history, the peripateia for all that is breaking. The fruiting of negative dialectics is the Word, true to the end, beyond which opens up the infinity of a Trinitarian life always greater than the hells of our lovelessness. The judgment of God is the vindication of every victim of sin, accomplished by the fidelity, the being-true-to-the-end, of Jesus.

"For this reason, faith in the Last Judgment is first and foremost hope—the need for which was made abundantly clear in the upheavals of recent centuries. I am convinced that the question of justice constitutes the essential argument, or in any case the strongest argument, in favor of faith in eternal life. The purely individual need for a fulfillment that is denied to us in this life, for an everlasting love that we await, is certainly an important motive for believing that man was made for eternity; but only in connection with the impossibility that the injustice of history should be the final word does the necessity for Christ's return and for new life become fully convincing."

What Pope Benedict teaches here is a profound affirmation of the theologian Johann Baptist Metz, who learned so much from the Frankfurt School: the essential argument for faith in eternal life is the absolute necessity that every suffering human be vindicated. To be true to the memory of victims requires our hope-filled faith in the Faithful One, the One Who believes the unsurveyable plan of loving goodness of His Father, though all is dark, with the stench of history's abbatoir heavy in the air. The victims must be vindicated; therefore, there must be resurrection unto eternal life.

No Kingdom without a critical social theory that destroys all the idols of religion and of irreligion, so that in the stillness of the clearing, the true religion of totally self-emptying love may interrupt with utter faithfulness and true judgment the anguish of every social totality.

These are some of the themes we will discuss in tomorrow's final session of Massachusetts Citizens for Life's Pro-Life Social Doctrine Certificate Program. Tune in on FB Live around 9:15 am!

Postscript to My “Black Panther” Review: On Race, Class, and the Marked Body

[This was written in response to a helpfully provocative comment on my Facebook page about my review.]

I can appreciate many of your points. There's a lot of the inner Marxist in me also, for I burn with a desire to see the poor unearthed from under the mountain of counter-opportunity, the responsibility for which lies squarely with the protected and comfortable classes.

Surely the most damning of all the ideologizations composing the Left is the one that saw them trade a vital sensitivity to the fundamental quality of class for the First-World problematics of intersectionality. For anyone who has any appreciation for the real contributions of Marxist social theory, it is a breathtaking intellectual collapse. Breathtaking. 

And, yes, there is only one thing that sets the toxicity of racism apart from, say, the toxicity of pro-choice ideology: as you rightly and righteously indicate, it's the sheer stupidity of taking "race" as almost a metaphysical determinant. (The ironies redouble when many who treat it so at the same time don't understand how ineffaceable chromosomal sex is.) I am a child of an American and a Taiwanese. What race am I? How much of the blood of "another" race takes away your club card? Do the profound differences of culture within a race matter? Does it make any sense to speak of a white race? And so on. So, concedo.

And, yes, it is an obscenity, a perverse grotesquerie, for anyone with any kind of comfortable life to tell "trailer trash" that they are infected with white privilege. Talking that way is a sure sign of class privilege, the privilege that counts most.

All granted. And yet, there is a black community, that, as a whole, is hurting, that does endure indignities up and down the line, especially with regard to policing. Now, there's a lot of "white" blood mixed into that community, especially given the mass rape of slaves. All the complications of the intellectual thinness of "race" as a concept are there to be seen. And yet. If you look "black," a whole social order (surely a class order serving to maintain the privilege of the protected and the comfortable) routinely fails to acknowledge your human dignity. We cannot ignore that. Are "white trash" Trump voters also dehumanized by the denizens of the city and suburbs of the comfortable? Yes. But not to see how deep the American race wound goes, is not to see. 

As for the movie Black Panther: I don't recall any point at which the desperate poor white was tagged with "white privilege." Perhaps that was an ambiguity in my presentation. I am very grateful to you for giving me the chance to qualify what I wrote in terms of the more fundamental dynamics of class.

But the incoherences of race notwithstanding, the persons embodied with more melanin are in a far more precarious position in American society, especially if that brown body occupies a lower socioeconomic class (as they disproportionately do). And in our nation, that has everything to do with our original sin of slavery. This lover of America will never forget the suffering of those victims.

African/American Aspiration: On “Black Panther” and the Political Philosophy of the MCU

For the first time ever, I watched a movie on preview-screening night. Indeed, only once or twice before have I seen a movie on its opening weekend at all. I prefer to wait until the crowds thin out.

But I love the Marvel Cinematic Universe (MCU) movies, and Avengers: Infinity War had promised to provide the supreme cinematic spectacle. So, my oldest kids and I have just come back from that. [It was excellent, with a serious moral and socio-political outlook—anti-utilitarian and anti-Malthusian. Tonally, it is a tragicomic marvel.]

On the eve of the full premiere of the latest Avengers, this is the last opportune moment to provide a review of Black Panther, which I should have done weeks ago. It is now the third-highest-grossing movie in domestic box office, behind only Star Wars: The Force Awakens and Avatar (in unadjusted dollars). Why has Black Panther done so well?

First, it belongs to the first-rank of the Marvel movies, along with the first and third Thor movies, the first (and now the third) Avengers, the first Guardians of the Galaxy (here I should also mention the last ten minutes of the GotG sequel, the most affecting moments in the 19 movies so far), and the second and third Captain America movies (The Winter Soldier and Civil War). Those last are my favorites, the most dramatically artful, which explains why Infinity War is so good, as the Russo brothers also directed those two.

Among these movies, Black Panther provides the most food for thought, especially with regard to living our common life, so its success makes me hopeful for the possibility of a revival of democratic deliberation. But this would require receiving movies more actively. The passive consumption of movies, even so thoughtful a one as Black Panther, negates the possibility of such drama fostering moral and social good. We should talk about the movies we watch, thinking the issues through, because no one and nothing else can do our thinking for us. And there is no moral or social progress without thoughtfulness.

I will frame this as a response to the always-interesting philosopher Slavoj Žižek’s review of the movie. In “Quasi Duo Fantasias: A Straussian Reading of Black Panther” (it is typically arch of Žižek to fly the banner of Strauss here), he begins by noting that people all across the political spectrum like the movie. This, for him, is evidence of the corruption of the work, let’s say it’s status as a culture-industry commodity: “When all sides recognize themselves in the same product, we can be sure that the product in question is ideology at its purest—a kind of empty vessel containing antagonistic elements.”

This is incorrect. Ideology is the obscuring of reality to serve the interests of power. It seems to me a social-realist delusion to want to eliminate hermeneutical ambiguity and amplitude from a work of art. A Lacanian, even a Leninist Lacanian, should know better. (Or not: how much ambiguity do the master narratives of psychotherapy allow?)

Now, one could possibly attribute the wide and contradictory range of favorable political response to intellectual vacuity, but a political film cannot be gainsaid by citing its opening a door to the reconciliation of antagonisms. Rather, it’s a prima facie indication of a film’s political authenticity. If one will represent the political truly, non-ideologically, two things must always be safeguarded: the insuperability of political conflict and an urgent orientation towards universal reconciliation.

What must be in question, rather, is our, the viewers’, ideological commitments. Are we open enough to reality to let whatever is honestly presented of reality in a film to come at us? So, there are two things with regard to the reception of a movie: we must actively think, and we must do so intentionally trying to allow the movie to dislocate our own ideological commitments.

Žižek takes offense that this movie coopts the “Black Panther” brand from the black power organization founded in the late sixties. There can be no question that the movie is doing this, most clearly evidenced in situating crucial scenes in Oakland, California. I think this a good thing.

The point of the film is not to promote black quiescence or salve the guilt of white insouciance. Rather, it would kindle aspiration in the souls of black folk, as well as in each American soul as such. And it is this remarkable balance that most particularly makes me respect this film. Without pretending a homogenous American soul, it cultivates universal aspiration. There is a preferential concern for the black community, as there ought to be, but it makes this concern American as such.

The movie rejects the nihilism of civil and race war as a solution to the real problems of black social existence. Not having any Leninist hankerings, and not sympathetic to contemporary militia delusions of the right to revolt, I think this exactly the opposite of ideology.

Erik Killmonger is the best MCU villain (with the half-exception of Loki). The danger of superhero movies is to feed into a viewer’s egoistic fantasy of being the hero against indistinct enemies who have uncomplicated malice as their motive. The promise of superhero movies is to make us want to be more, to be great for the sake of the defense of the weaker. Essential to making the promise blossom is to have enemies who are complex, who have accessible motives, motives that we can judge to be wrong while being worth thinking through.

Killmonger is very well motivated—in his childhood trauma, in his sense of responsibility for his race. But, in the end, his solution is the solution of a traumatized person trapped in his trauma, the solution of a victim who remains a victim: to negate. It is telling that Žižek characterizes Killmonger’s goal in the following way: “Erik advocates a militant global solidarity.” That’s an ideological misrepresentation of what Killmonger explicitly details: he wants to employ the War Dogs and advanced technology of Wakanda to foment a global race war and secure black supremacy. That’s the opposite of solidarity. It’s simply the internalization and inversion of the master’s narrative. And it is, ironically, a typically narcissistic, indeed imperialist, pseudo-American project.

But Killmonger is Žižek’s hero, and here Žižek’s mysticism of the act, of the silver bullet, does not serve him well. It favors nihilism. Killmonger orders the destruction of the source of charismatic leadership, the plant that enables the Black Panther to protect his people (“Burn it all!”), then leads that people into civil war: his pain has led him to nihilism. He’s not building for a future. Everything culminates and ends with him. He is Hegel’s Absolute in full cunning.

Žižek isn’t moved by the alternative pursued by the true hero: “Meanwhile T’Challa is slowly moving away from the traditional isolationism of ‘Wakanda first!’ to a gradual and peaceful globalism that would act within the coordinates of the existing world order and its institutions, spreading education and technological help—and simultaneously maintain the unique Wakandan culture and way of life.”

(Of course, this is why those who would somehow see the movie as justification for Trump’s odious immigration policies are precisely refuted by the movie. That said, T’Challa IS a patriot. And that’s just right: a patriot who wants to serve the global common good as well. And here it’s worth observing the value of our hero's being a king—and I am the opposite of a monarchist. If we identify with this hero, we have to identify with his responsibility for his people. We have to feel the common good as the impulse at the heart of heroism.)

This is the right vision to have: a patriotic and universalist humanism that makes a preferential option for the weakest. It’s what the Black Panther Party could have been before indulging its militia pretensions. (This is, by the way, what the pro-life movement is meant to be in its truth.)

Žižek thinks that our hero is playing footsie with malign forces of globalization. He makes much that CIA Agent Ross is a good guy in the movie (he doesn’t seem to relish the fun of Bilbo and Gollum doing an interrogation scene together!): “That T’Challa opens up to ‘good’ globalization but is also supported by its repressive embodiment, the CIA, demonstrates that there is no real tension between the two...”

Here I will grant that Žižek has something, but it’s confused. The fact is that we are not led to trust the CIA or America’s spy power or bureacracies in the MCU. The narrative arc in The Winter Soldier and Civil War settles that.

The tragedy of Captain America: Civil War is that there is no good solution. [I am not the only one for whom Captain America is the favorite MCU character. He embodies the best of the American soul: a common man’s desire to do right, and revulsion at basic injustice (truth, justice, and the American way, and all that), who takes the dignity of each individual in full earnestness—against all utilitarianism: a Kantian warrior.] On the one hand, it is essential to order power (including the superpowers of heroes) under processes of democratic deliberation. There must be accountability. On the other hand, based on the events of The Winter Soldier, Captain America correctly understands that no elite organization can be trusted—not the spy agencies or bureaucrats of the United States, and not the United Nations. (Indeed, one could see an enactment of American liberalism—epitomized in the Madisonian machinery of the Constitution— in leaving the Avengers free to counterbalance crony capitalist and elitist mega-organizations.)

T’Challa is introduced in Civil War, and he is on the side of bringing the Avengers to heel under UN power. And this is indeed a mistake. Why would any African leader trust international organizations to this extent? But the MCU movies have given us the tools to demystify the organizations of the global elite. T’Challa still has to learn more about the global power dynamics he is leading his people into. (Though perhaps Thanos renders all of this jejune...)

In misunderstanding the final, tragic, tableau featuring Killmonger and T’Challa, Žižek gathers his misconceptions together: “…[Killmonger] prefers to die free than to be healed and survive in the false abundance of Wakanda.” Killmonger faces imprisonment for fomenting civil war, though also within the ambit of a real, and gratuitous, offer of reconciliation. In refusing a future, he evokes his ancestors in the floating concentration camps of the Middle Passage: “Bury me in the ocean where my ancestors who jumped from ships, ‘cause they knew death was better than bondage.” Of course, most of them couldn’t jump—chained, anti-suicide measures in place to protect the “investment.” (And the ones who were successful in escaping from the sheer terror were not making a grand ideological statement: they were trying to return home, somehow, even if death had to be traversed.) What most of the great American race of black folk did was endure, under unimaginable horror, within a night of immeasurable intensity and extent. And in their rising, and in our earnest common pursuit of the preferential option for the victims (joined to a passion for universal reconciliation), we might all rise: Africa, America, the world.

Exchange the Present for a Future of Love

We celebrate the martyr Saint Fidelis today. His religious name comes from Revelation 2:10: "Do not fear what you are about to suffer. Behold, the devil is about to throw some of you into prison that you might be tested, and you shall be afflicted for ten days. Be faithful [fidelis] even unto death, and I will give you the crown of life."

The faithfulness of Christian love must straddle life and death, must bring life where there was only death before. 

Saint Fidelis was a Capuchin follower of Saint Francis of Assisi, and so his identity was with the unsuccessful, those who did not occupy the high places of the world. From the perspective of the lowly and wretched of the earth, Saint Fidelis was able to be faithful to the faith, by which alone the power-games of the world are overcome. Before becoming a priest, he was a lawyer. He left the pathways of secular power to care for those on the outside of worldly success.

The matins reading for today's feast records words from the last sermon Saint Fidelis gave before being beaten to death:

"What made the holy apostles and martyrs endure fierce agony and bitter torments, except faith, and especially faith in the resurrection?

"What is it that today makes true followers of Christ cast luxuries aside, leave pleasures behind, and endure difficulties and pain? It is living faith 'that expresses itself through love.' It is this that makes us put aside the goods of the present in the hope of future goods. It is because of faith that we exchange the present for the future."

When I was secure in the world, I would have suspected this sentiment of otherworldliness. Of course, Saint Fidelis is simply correct. There is no place for love in this world. Faith must create life where there is otherwise only death.

Dialectical Sensuality v. Currencies of Control: A Note on Lady Chatterley's Lover

I've been revising some of my first poems, including my sonnet sub-sequence on Hector's last days. At the time, I was reading D. H. Lawrence's Lady Chatterley's Lover, a very fine novel, but I didn't end up finishing the book until recently.

Lawrence puts big themes on the table, still relevant today: class warfare, consumerist subjectivity, hollow marriages, deep reticence about bodies and pleasure. Lawrence does not always strike the right balance (sexual reconciliation is in fact not sufficient for social reconciliation—though the former is necessary for the latter; words/intellect need not be at war with sensual vitality; children cannot be treated as an afterthought). But what he does get right, he gets profoundly right. The book was written in the wake of the Great War, when the mining communities of his home turf were being brutally squeezed. In Nietzschean tones, Lawrence recommends an art of living to resolve the social contradictions. His greatest mistake is to treat the masses as if they can't think, and that they shouldn't anyway—he thinks thought enervating. I maintain that the liberal arts are essential for the art of living. But it's no either/or. He's right about the enemy: it's avarice and envy and all the substitutes for really living (war, money, control). And when there's policing, from whatever religion (including the strange dogmatism of social progressivism), it's usually the Powers seeking to smother the little flames of personhood.

At the end of the book, Mellors is writing to Connie, while the two must remain apart for a time, and this passage tells us much about the crisis that stills envelops us, a crisis of embodiment, of marriage, of existence:

"If you could only tell them that living and spending isn't the same thing! But it's no good. If only they were educated to live instead of earn and spend, they could manage very happily on twenty-five shillings. If the men wore scarlet trousers, as I said, they wouldn't think so much of money: if they could dance and hop and skip, and sing and swagger and be handsome, they could do with very little cash. And amuse the women themselves, and be amused by the women. They ought to learn to be naked and handsome, and to sing in a mass and dance the old group dances, and carve the stools they sit on, and embroider their own emblems. Then they wouldn't need money. And that's the only way to solve the industrial problem: train the people to be able to live, and live in handsomeness, without needing to spend...

"But the colliers aren't pagan, far from it. They're a sad lot, a deadened lot of men: dead to their women, dead to life. The young ones scoot about on motor-bikes with girls, and jazz when they get a chance. But they're very dead. And it needs money. Money poisons you when you've got it, and starves you when you haven't.

"...But of course what I live for now is for you and me to live together. I'm frightened, really. I feel the devil in the air, and he'll try to get us. Or not the devil, Mammon: which I think, after all, is only the mass-will of people, wanting money and hating life. Anyhow I feel great grasping white hands in the air, wanting to get hold of the throat of anybody who tries to live, to live beyond money, and squeeze the life out. There's a bad time coming."

Universal Hope

[Much of this was written in response to observations made by my friend Christopher Altieri on my post "Never Despair of God's Mercy."]

When I wrote "radical," I meant that Pope Benedict's observation about Judas is such a trenchant expression of the hope for universal salvation that it is without much precedent among orthodox theologians, let alone popes—as an expression.

But part of the burden of what I was saying is that what he said in that audience talk is not an assertion of mere personal theological opinion. (I don't think that's how the charism of the papal office works.) It is the Gospel as such, and, even in the context of the post-Augustinian grappling with the implications of original sin, it belongs to a centuries-old development of doctrine. The truth of what Pope Benedict said would not have eluded most of the Church fathers (especially of the East). 

The great Augustine, who has meant so much to Benedict and to me, did the important work of differentiating original sin, and thereby the gratuity of grace. But his hypothesis that the massa damnata burns in hell has been found more and more wanting in the growing appropriation of the faith by Holy Mother Church. 

Of most note in this development is one of the most beautiful things done in the history of theology: Saint Thomas Aquinas's proposal of limbo. To die in original sin does not merit hell properly speaking. Rather, he posited a place of natural happiness, though weighed down by the supreme privation of intimate Trinitarian communion, the pathos of which pervades Virgil's journey with Dante in Purgatory.

Aquinas's proposal was one of the greatest acts of authentic liberalization in intellectual history. I love him so much for doing that.

That was an important stage in the ongoing doctrinal development, which I think fairly nicely surveyed in the International Theological Commission's The Hope of Salvation for Infants Who Die Without Being Baptized:  http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/cti_documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20070419_un-baptised-infants_en.html. That, combined with Henri Rondet's The Grace of Christ, yields a good overview, proving your point about how Pope Benedict's officially taught agnosticism on the ultimate fate of Judas Iscariot is not, substantially, radical at all. 

I myself have come to the view, I think, mostly following the greatest Doctor of Hell, C. S. Lewis, that the notion of an externally imposed (heteronomous) eternal punishment for any finite act completely bankrupt as a philosophical or theological notion, and grotesquely misrepresentative of the goodness of the Father. If any of us humans ends up in hell, it is because that is where we want to be (that is, it is an act of perverse autonomy, not heteronomy). Now, such a choice IS as such a punishment: the supreme punishment is to be left to our lovelessness, separated from the intimacy of the New Jerusalem, the intimacy that alone could quell our infinite desire. To continue to be, when what IS is love, while rejecting that love, means burning in futility.

And we are none of us unfamiliar with those flames. The real question about hell is not what might be lurking in the hidden decrees of God. God is not playing a grotesque game of musical chairs (a belief Hamlet exemplifies, perversely, when he pulls back from killing King Claudius at prayer). Our hope in God's goodness must be absolute. No, the real question is what might be lurking in my own heart. 

That is, I am not so sure that you or I or anyone deserves, as such, hellfire for our sins. I do not see how any finite act, or any sum of finite acts, can merit infinite punishment. (And, of course, there is no question of our deserving, as such, Trinitarian intimacy.) What I do know is that every time I sin, something very dark from the depths of my heart is rearing its head: that willful ego that would choose my reality over Reality. And that person is the kind of person who might find it attractive to reign in hell, rather than serve in heaven. 

Balthasar observes that Jesus opens up heaven and hell simultaneously before the human person (which had been closed before His decisive appearance). It is our Yes to Him that allows us to be led to heaven; it is our No to Him that heads to hell. That No would not be, as such, the commission of a certain crime (any one of the long series of crimes we have all committed). Rather, that No is said in each of our crimes, a choice on my part (not on God's) to have my own Kingdom. We hope in the goodness of the Father that through the Spirit of the Crucified, He will be able to defang and destroy this beast in us. And what I hope for myself, I hope for all. 

So, we agree, and I appreciate your giving me the opportunity to make this clear.

Hell is real. It is filled with myriads of the most powerful persons ever created (angels). It may or may not be the site of my or any other human's eternity. But it is a real possibility for any of us to choose. I hope that the good Father's will that none of us so choose it will prevail in every case.

As for the descriptor "lover of hell": well, it does describe people I have had conversations with. You will, I guess, have to trust that I am not being hysterical in this. I suppose if you looked at some of the more immoderate refusals of Balthasar's simple rehearsal of Gospel truth (a rehearsal, again, less radically expressed than what Pope Benedict officially taught) in Dare We Hope That All Men Be Saved?, you might see what I'm talking about. It wasn't simple tendentiousness for Balthasar to label this affect "infernalism." What else accounts for intelligent people refusing to acknowledge Balthasar's repeated distinction between universal hope and universalism? It's not that hard to grasp. So, it seems there's an affective block in play. When we have putative evangelists thinking that preaching the supposed fewness of those who get to heaven essential to evangelization... Well, what I see is a collective psychosis within Western Catholicism, in which a demonic logic of counter-justification has infested otherwise good people. 

They, along with me, are the most in danger of hell, and I pray for their souls. 

I will close with your judicious, and beautiful, words: "Some of the brethren are of the opinion that the faith requires us to confess that hell is peopled. That has been the opinion of many great saints. Absent a bona fide conviction in the necessity of such a belief and confession as de fide, I cannot imagine anyone holding that opinion."

Never Despair of God's Mercy

[Posted yesterday on Facebook and Beyond All Telling.]

On Joseph Ratzinger/Pope Benedict's birthday, we are filled with gratitude for the existence of such a man.

And in light of the latest manufactured kerfuffle about our current Holy Father, I want to highlight what I love most about Benedict: his profound universalistic tendency. In this, he is more radical than his theological colleague Balthasar, who has always been the whipping boy of the infernalists.

In his 18 October 2006 audience talk on Judas Iscariot and Matthias, Pope Benedict, in his official teaching capacity, appropriates Balthasar's point that humanity in successively larger circles betrays Jesus--Christian, Jew, Gentile. But it is the first betrayal that bears most guilt. And this is what those who love hell forget: it is we Christians who are most in danger of condemnation. From those to whom much has been given, much is expected.

Pope Benedict places this unkindest cut of all, the Christian betrayal, in a larger context, the one that matters:

"What is more, it darkens the mystery around his eternal fate, knowing that Judas 'repented and brought back the 30 pieces of silver to the chief priests and the elders, saying, "I have sinned in betraying innocent blood"' (Mt 27:3-4). Even though he went to hang himself (cf. Mt 27:5), it is not up to us to judge his gesture, substituting ourselves for the infinitely merciful and just God."

It is hard to overstate how theologically radical that last sentence is. Nevertheless, what the Holy Father teaches here is the truth, the very crux of the Father's whole plan of salvation: God seeks the salvation of each human, and so we must hope for that--and expend everything for that end.

"The betrayal of Judas remains, in any case, a mystery. Jesus treated him as a friend (cf. Mt 26:50); however, in His invitations to follow Him along the way of the beatitudes, He does not force his will or protect it from the temptations of Satan, respecting human freedom.

"In effect, the possibilities to pervert the human heart are truly many. The only way to prevent it consists in not cultivating an individualistic, autonomous vision of things, but on the contrary, by putting oneself always on the side of Jesus, assuming His point of view. We must daily seek to build full communion with him."

That "side" of Jesus is only one: the salvation of all. He is the true partisan of humanity. All consignment of others to hell is simple egoistic autonomy (the self-assertion of ressentiment)--the opposite of theonomy.

"Let us remember that Peter also wanted to oppose Him and what awaited Him at Jerusalem, but he received a very strong reproof: 'You are not on the side of God, but of men' (Mk 8:33)!

"After his fall, Peter repented and found pardon and grace. Judas also repented, but his repentance degenerated into desperation and thus became self-destructive.

"For us it is an invitation to always remember what St. Benedict says at the end of the fundamental Chapter Five of his 'Rule': 'Never despair of God's mercy.' In fact, God 'is greater than our hearts,' as St. John says (I Jn 3:20).

"Let us remember two things. The first: Jesus respects our freedom. The second: Jesus awaits our openness to repentance and conversion; He is rich in mercy and forgiveness.

"Besides, when we think of the negative role Judas played we must consider it according to the lofty ways in which God leads events. His betrayal led to the death of Jesus, Who transformed this tremendous torment into a space of salvific love by consigning Himself to the Father (cf. Gal 2:20; Eph 5:2, 25).

"The word 'to betray' is the version of a Greek word that means 'to consign.' Sometimes the subject is even God in Person: it was He Who for love 'consigned' Jesus for all of us (Rm 8:32). In His mysterious salvific plan, God assumes Judas's inexcusable gesture as the occasion for the total gift of the Son for the redemption of the world."

Here's the final Balthasarian point of Pope Benedict: the ultimate horizon of the "handing-over" or "consignment" of Jesus is the primal and universal philanthropy of the Father. And in that supreme paradox, all the misery of our sinfulness may yet be swallowed up.

Desire in an Age of Biopower

In The Gospel of Life, Pope Saint John Paul II exemplifies a Christian critique of ideology. He does not moralize when it comes to the direct threats against the weakest human life in the modern world: he demystifies the ideological pressures impelling abortion and euthanasia, the pressures impelling each of us in our evasions of solidarity.

All of us who would be pro-life must internalize this shift from moralism to social justice, over and over. It is wrong to denounce mothers who procure abortion (as Kevin Williamson had done). Rather, we must see the web that snares us all, a consumerist inflammation of our fallen tendency towards egoistic imperialism, which funds an ideological totality of ever-increasing scope as our technological power grows.

John Paul writes in no. 18:

"Decisions that go against life sometimes arise from difficult or even tragic situations of profound suffering, loneliness, a total lack of economic prospects, depression, and anxiety about the future. Such circumstances can mitigate even to a notable degree subjective responsibility and the consequent culpability of those who make these choices, which in themselves are evil. But today the problem goes far beyond the necessary recognition of these personal situations. It is a problem which exists at the cultural, social, and political levels, where it reveals its more sinister and disturbing aspect in the tendency, ever more widely shared, to interpret the above crimes against life as legitimate expressions of individual freedom, to be acknowledged and protected as actual rights."

A violence that infests each of our interiorities and intimate relations, we dare cloak with the sacred name of liberty.

At stake in such obfuscation is the very viability of political liberalism:

"In this way, and with tragic consequences, a long historical process is reaching a turning-point. The process which once led to discovering the idea of 'human rights'—rights inherent in every person and prior to any constitution or State legislation—is today marked by a surprising contradiction. Precisely in an age when the inviolable rights of the person are solemnly proclaimed and the value of life is publicly affirmed, the very right to life is being denied or trampled upon, especially at the more significant moments of existence: the moment of birth and the moment of death."

The truth of human "rights" is that they are absolutes inscribed by God in the personal depths of each living human body so that no totality (whether of the integralist or secularist-oligarchic variety) might swallow up the singular in a false organicity or a sleek social machine. The right to life, and the right to religious liberty, stand athwart the bright ideas of whichever of us egoists has the social power. They are correlative with Levinas's "face" that demands infinite responsibility from you and me, and, at the very least, that speaks from whatever vulnerable human flesh: "Do not kill me."

It is not "liberalism" to speak of rights, while claiming that there are humans who have no right to life. It's the other thing:

"How can these repeated affirmations of principle be reconciled with the continual increase and widespread justification of attacks on human life? How can we reconcile these declarations with the refusal to accept those who are weak and needy, or elderly, or those who have just been conceived? These attacks go directly against respect for life, and they represent a direct threat to the entire culture of human rights. It is a threat capable, in the end, of jeopardizing the very meaning of democratic coexistence: rather than societies of 'people living together,' our cities risk becoming societies of people who are rejected, marginalized, uprooted, and oppressed."

I have always maintained that defense of the most powerless human life is the decisive touchstone of a humanistic materialism. We must not strike that vulnerable human body. How could there be Enlightenment in that? Cosmopolitanism in that? Democracy in that?

But this is also a touchstone of the earnestness of our personal commitment to human dignity: we are all caught up in processes of dehumanization. Every time we point to "those others" as the cause of death's empire, we miss the first thing: it is my egoism that gives rise to death.

You are invited to tune in to the next session of Massachusetts Citizens for Life's Pro-Life Social Doctrine Certificate program tomorrow at around 9:15 am. We'll be discussing The Gospel of Life, Roe v. Wade, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, Yeats, Christopher Kaczor and Janet Smith's Life Issues, Medical Choices, and some Foucault and Agamben for good measure.

A Day of Anniversaries

This is a day of confluence for me. Twenty years ago, I was welcomed into the maternal embrace of the Catholic Church, receiving the sacrament of Confirmation and receiving the Body and Blood of Jesus for the first time—the food that has kept me alive. For the gift of Jesus in the Eucharist, and for the fullness of the Catholic faith, I cannot be grateful enough to the good Father of us all.

I thought that year would set the basic parameters of my life, and, in religion, it has. Another putative sacrament later that year didn't seem to take, so my vocation is still fundamentally in question (at my age!) But in all the darkness of these last years of my life, there has been Jesus in the Eucharist, and there has been an unbreakable faith. Blessed be God.

A year ago, on this day, Lillian Vogl (my Catholic-birthday buddy) and I launched the blog "Beyond All Telling."

But before all of this, it was on this day in 1980 that my father died. To be fatherless in this world is a hard thing, and if no one on this earth steps into that role spiritually, it is a privation hard to even survey.

And yet the good Father of us all exists, and He is good, and there will be when all shall be well.

This poem is from my first manuscript (my father flew B-17s in WWII, and was shot down twice):

Flying Fortress

For my father

How cold it must have been those three dozen sorties;
How loud, within the belly of the dragon;
How quiet, floating down a thousand stories;
And colder, when your friend was strafed and slackened.
It ruined you. You couldn’t drink enough
To exorcise the gelid cacophony. 
You fathered freedom, though, and, in that, us,
Crushed the rage that slaughtered Jews so savagely.
Still, I can’t keep a father. They all go.
Joseph, David’s son, could you foster me?
Of my unquiet bapa, too, take custody?
And ward my children’s own unpatroned woe?
Would that the festal, gliding, glinting ranks
Drop soundless fire upon these orphaned banks.

Who Will Contend with Me?

[Posting on Facebook yesterday.]

In today's matins reading, Melito of Sardis seems to be dramatizing the Jesus described in the near-universalist peroration of Saint Paul in Romans 8:31-35: "What then shall we say to these things? If God is for us, who can be against us? He Who did not spare His own Son but gave Him up for us all, how will He not also withHim graciously give us all things? Who shall bring any charge against God's elect? It is God Who justifies. Who is to condemn? Christ Jesus is the One Who died—more than that, Who was raised—Who is at the right hand of God, Who indeed is interceding for us. Who shall separate us from the love of Christ?"

The desire and work of God is to justify each human. It is the work of Satan to be humanity's adversary, to bring charges against each of us. But if we are Christian, we follow the One Who justifies:

"The Lord, though He was God, became man. He suffered for the sake of those who suffer, He was bound for those in bonds, condemned for the guilty, buried for those who lie in the grave; but He rose from the dead, and cried aloud: 'Who will contend with Me? Let him confront Me.' I have freed the condemned, brought the dead back to life, raised men from their graves. Who has anything to say against Me? I, He said, am the Christ; I have destroyed death, triumphed over the enemy, trampled hell underfoot, bound the strong one, and taken men up to the heights of heaven: I am the Christ."

Jesus is ready to rumble.

He has won His plenary authority to justify through a total substitutionary solidarity--His real identification with each of us, all the way to the screaming depths of godforsakenness.

He allowed Himself to be swallowed by the world of alienation and suffering, but the Fish ended up swallowing the Leviathan. And now there is not one single human being of any time or place, not one people or culture, for whom the pearly gates of the Kingdom of God do not stand open:

"Come, then, all you nations of men, receive forgiveness for the sins that defile you. I am your forgiveness. I am the Passover that brings salvation. I am the lamb who was immolated for you. I am your ransom, your life, your resurrection, your light. I am your salvation and your king. I will bring you to the heights of heaven. With My own right hand, I will raise you up, and I will show you the eternal Father."

He is truly risen; hope stirs in the viscera of the world.

Love Alone Gives Life: Notes on MCFL's Annual Convention

The annual convention of Massachusetts Citizens for Life this past Saturday was outstanding. 

David Reardon, of the Elliott Institute, keynoted. His incisive points included the following:

1. A basic and decisive fact we gloss over is that once a woman is pregnant, everything has already changed. She has become a mother. It is because of that momentous reality that what happens afterwards (abortion, adoption, raising her child) is momentous. A little clarity and honesty about the reality of sex is necessary for intelligent discussion of abortion.
2. Reardon is very good on the power differentials actually involved in abortion. It takes a certain privileged social positioning not to acknowledge the fact that the legalization of abortion meant that many, many mothers, especially young ones, became radically exposed thereby to the pressures of irresponsible men, and of families prioritizing the preservation of social respectability. “It’s legal. It’s no big deal. If you choose not to do it, then it’s all on you.” No one with a critical social sensibility will want to evade this point.
3. Then Reardon started in on some basic evangelical dynamics, given how many women have had abortions and how deeply they are suffering from that, whether they recognize it or not. He was making an appeal to our pro-life hearts to be evermore compassionate, to build a sensitivity to pain into the way we approach the public discussion of abortion. “When one recognizes one’s sin, one is vulnerable,” so one might therefore lash out in defense of abortion. “We have all sinned, and mercy must surround all of us.” “It took the blood of Christ to remove our guilt; it takes the acceptance of others to remove our shame.”

There were many other powerful presentations, but I want to single out one other, that of Catherine Morrissey, who spoke of how she dealt with a teen pregnancy by making the painful decision to give her son up for adoption. I have listened to pro-life talks for a couple of decades. This was one of the most moving. She did what was best for her child, a thing hard but beautiful.

One point that became clear along the way from her presentation: the social shaming of fornication incentivizes abortion. It must end. Yes, fornication is in fact not perfective of the human person. Morrissey’s own testimony made clear what kind of pain can result. But we must communicate the objective defectiveness of fornication with a recognition that God has placed a very powerful impulse in us, one that generates immense ambiguities and involves immense difficulties. We must tell the objective facts objectively, not moralistically. (The key point about sexual teaching is the social-justice recognition that children are owed a specific matrix of care; that's the gravamen of sex.) And we must always communicate the few redlines of sex in a spirit of humane recognition that failures in this realm are not the end of the world (indeed in the scale of sin, as such, they are the lightest). The most salient thing our children must know from us, beyond the truths which we do in fact owe them, is that we will love them no matter what, just like our good Father above. Anything else is the antithesis of being pro-life, for love alone gives life.

On the Pro-Life Direction of Providence: The Christian Withdrawal from Killing

This is a follow-up to a comment on a previous Facebook post concerning the March for Our Lives [in the wake of the shootings in Parkland, Florida], in which the commentator asked what gun-control restrictions I had in mind. In general, I want to see a heightening of licensing requirements. (There is nothing more fundamental to liberty than one's ability to move about freely, and yet the state regulates automobiles to the hilt.) 

Under Heller, the Second Amendment has been reinterpreted to be about "the core lawful purpose of self-defense." I say reinterpreted because given any specific knowledge of the civic conversation at the time, it should be recognized that the core question at issue in the Second Amendment is broader: it is about the right to revolt, which had barely fifteen years before been acted on by town militias, of ordinary citizens, at Lexington and Concord. Both Anti-Federalists and Federalists believed in the right to revolt, of course, but the Anti-Federalists were very worried about the near-plenary authority the Constitution had vested in Congress over the army and militia. The awkward phrasing of the Second Amendment is an attempt to fudge the common belief in a right to revolt in a way that would ease specific Anti-Federalist concerns somehow.

The Heller majority focused on establishing the "individual right to bear arms" against the fairly recent legal innovation claiming that the Second Amendment had only established a collective right to bear arms. That latter view is indeed absurd. But fixating on addressing that fantasy of Constitutional interpretation meant that what Blackstone called "the natural right of resistance and self-preservation" at stake in the right to have arms was, largely, truncated to the question of self-preservation. (To be sure, the Founders would not have second-guessed the right of the people to have weapons for hunting and self-defense.)

That said, I am personally thankful that the majority under Heller made this truncation. In theory I believe in the right to revolt. But under no circumstances do I ever envision shooting an American soldier--not least because my father was one. And as David French argues forcefully and well, but I believe in a way that is its own reductio ad absurdum, foregrounding the right to revolt means, in principle, enabling access to weapons powerful enough to prove effective as a deterrent against a government that would wield the might of the American military against the people.

My support of the right to revolt in principle combined with a profound reticence to countenance any activation of it in practice dovetails with my point about the general Christian tendency to withdraw from killing. Pacifism is not the teaching of the Church, and I am not a pacifist. If we care about the victims of history, we must stand ready to apply force against predators. But every Christian should feel within him or herself a tectonic pull towards pacifism. Likewise, I recognize that capital punishment is not intrinsically evil, but I have also come, in Catholic docility, more and more into harmony with the tendency (since Pope Saint John Paul II's analytical siting of capital punishment within the culture of death in Evangelium vitae) to leave the option behind. The last case of justified killing, self-defense, is the easiest: surely every Christian recognizes from the Sermon on the Mount the radical possibility of sacrificing oneself in favor of an aggressor. The one instance in which there is no question that the possibility of killing is on the table is when those directly in my care are threatened. It is one thing for me to turn the other cheek, quite another for me to turn a vulnerable person's cheek. We must not fail in our basic responsibilities towards our children, towards those who have less power. (Of course, there can be no question in natural law, and certainly not in Christianity, of killing someone merely to defend property. That would be a demonic inversion of values.)

I used to complain about the translation of the Fifth Commandment as "Thou shalt not kill." As a moral theologian, I would note that "kill" is too generic; it has not been specified by a moral object. It should be "Thou shalt not murder." And, technically, that is true.

And yet. And yet. Human killing is something we should always be in the practice of withdrawing from. That withdrawal belongs at the heart of the New Law of grace. Grace perfects nature, yes, but it is a perversity to use that architectonic fact to insist grimly on a right to kill, to carve out an interior space, that tends to grow, in which I am at pains to assert my rights against a world of threats. That is not Christian liberty.

Grace perfects nature often by setting it within a context so vast, it will look to unevangelized eyes as if everything is upside down and backwards, even unto the Cross: loving and forgiving your enemy, though he be killing you.

The immensity of the Gospel cannot be legislated. (One cannot, for example, legislate away the natural-law right to self-preservation.) But Christians are to be a leaven in the world. Christians are to be fire from heaven. The structure of nature, designed by God, is not a static thing. It moves. And the directionality of that movement is towards universal reconciliation. Every Christian is called to be a minister of that pro-life directionality.

This direction is rooted in the natural law, but aims towards something limitless. As I wrote in my last post on this topic, it is the case that being pro-life means, first of all, feeling the urgency of the restoration of the right to life of each innocent human being in law. If one does not recognize that principle, the most rudimentary of the principles of liberal republicanism (the equality of each human life), it makes no sense to pursue, as we ought to pursue, the pro-life logic into the muddier waters of how exactly to regulate guns under the Second Amendment. But it is also the case that the pro-life impulse is there to move the whole dead and killing weight of history, of resentments, of fear, of scarcity, of entitlement.

To be pro-life is a radical thing: it begins with the fundamental responsibility towards the most vulnerable life, and it strains towards a heaven of peaceable infinity.

Beyond Our Unloveliness

[Posted on Facebook for the feast of Saint John of God, 8 March.]

From the matins reading from Saint John of God, exemplar of charity, who reminds us that living out the love of God is no recipe for ease:

"I work here [at the hospital and shelter founded by him] on borrowed money, a prisoner for the sake of Jesus Christ. And often my debts are so pressing that I dare not go out of the house for fear of being seized by my creditors."

To be caught up into the dimension of divine mercy and gratuity, to be a fool for God, means being homeless here. It means real financial distress, and social exclusion. If you've experienced it, you know there's a kind of trauma there.

But the lack of comfort goes far deeper:

"Whenever I see so many poor brothers and neighbors of mine suffering beyond their strength and overwhelmed with so many physical or mental ills which I cannot alleviate, then I become exceedingly sorrowful..."

The suffering of the wretched of the earth becomes our own. And how that throbs.

But it goes deeper still: think of how small our hearts are, especially if we're comfortable. From out of the parental neuroses and egoistic ugliness that rears its head and casually swipes at the young, and multifarious wounds inflicted upon the weaker all along the line as we grow up, we become unlovely in turn. It is so sad. There is so much meanness, so much contraction of soul. We can't say the true thing, or fight for justice, with gentleness or self-awareness or proportion. Unloveliness meets unloveliness. To look on that spectacle is to walk upon the weirs above despair. Is there a free human being anywhere? How many Christians are there, really? And what the Father wants is not a few...but all! It seems absurd, and most unlikely.

"...but I trust in Christ, Who knows my heart. And so I say: 'Woe to the man who trusts in men rather than in Christ.' Whether you like it or not, you will grow apart from men, but Christ is faithful and always with you, for Christ provides all things. Let us always give thanks to Him. Amen."

A Note on Pro-Life Principle and Civil Conversation in Light of the "March for Our Lives"

My friend Christopher Altieri has written a characteristically thoughtful piece on Saturday's demonstrations. It is fundamentally a plea for the patient and humbling and forbearing work of democratic deliberation.

Yes, to be "pro-life" means feeling within oneself the general Christian tendency to withdraw from killing. The regulation of gun ownership ought to reflect that. Absolutely. But the demonization of those who disagree with certain policy options is never right or good. It is the case that being pro-life means feeling the urgency of the restoration of the right to life of each innocent human being in law. If one does not recognize that principle, the most rudimentary of the principles of liberal republicanism (the equality of each human life), it makes no sense to pursue, as we ought to pursue, the pro-life logic into the muddier waters of how exactly to regulate guns under the Second Amendment. Prudence can only ever start from principle. If those who seek tighter regulation, as I certainly do, do not get the logic straight (including the distinction between principle and prudential option), given that this is a democracy in which the way to change things is precisely through the force of argument (and, indeed, not through brute force), then all the demonstrations in the world will be ineffective in achieving the important goal of stricter gun control.

And the pragmatics of success aside, everyone of us should seek to win our cause in a way most congruent with fostering social harmony no matter the outcome of the contest over the question (think of this as analogous to ius in bello). We must find a way to live together in any case. And the Christian always strains towards something more: universal reconciliation. Always. No exceptions.

Normalizing Suicide as the Death of Solidarity

The following was presented to the Massachusetts Legislature's Joint Committee on Public Health back in September. I never got around to posting it here, and given the stupendous news yesterday that physician-assisted suicide has died in committee for the year, it seemed a good occasion to do so.

Testimony in Opposition to H.1194/S.1225 (Legalizing Physician-Assisted Suicide)

Ladies and gentlemen of the committee, my name is David Franks, and I am chairman of the board of Massachusetts Citizens for Life. I am trained as a philosopher and theologian, and it is as an expert in social ethics that I speak to you today.

Normalizing suicide means the death of solidarity.

Our choices are not made in isolation. To be worthy of a republic, each of us citizens is obliged to recognize both the conditions and the ramifications of our choices, and to think deeply what freedom really means.

There are all kinds of good reasons to want to die. Above all, there is the simple exigence of escaping screaming psychological or physical pain.

And yet, until the day before yesterday, we have, rightly, removed suicide from the menu of choices that we allow our loved ones to contemplate in dealing with crises. Despite the reality of even intractable psychological pain, we have insisted that every person remain at his or her post in life.

The real problem is that this cannot be done alone.

Normalizing suicide is a radical way of denying the claims of human solidarity. It means pretending that the spiritual asphyxiation of the desperate, there, right next to us, though somewhat out of sight, is none of our business.

Not compassion, but savagery, makes peace with suicide.

Physician-assisted suicide is suicide.

And the specific kind of suicide that it is makes it even more damaging to the body politic. It forces our laws (and that means our communal self-understanding) into renouncing, yet further, the most basic demands of human solidarity.

As a social reality, physician-assisted suicide does not mean putting some person out of his or her misery. It is, by its logic, putting someone out of OUR misery. It is eugenic libertarianism red in tooth and claw.

Being human in history is not something else than helping each other stand at our posts even when it is excruciating. Being human means taking care, or it means nothing at all.

The school of care is suffering. We must learn never to cease caring. We must seek to absorb the suffering of others by our unremitting presence to them, in their agony, and affirm the absorption of our suffering by others.

Solidarity isn’t doing very well these days. Legalizing physician-assisted suicide would radicalize that trend, the trend to leave behind the poor and the addicted and the refugee and the medically dependent and the elderly and the hopeless and the forgotten—all of us who might be losers in the power games of the world.

Our Commonwealth is famously progressive. Please allow me to bring to mind some basic principles of progressive social theory.

If someone on the margins of life dies, it seems unseemly for any self-respecting progressive not to ask, “What social class interest has just been advanced?”

If a woman feels as if she doesn’t want to be a burden anymore, what misogynistic conditioning might be involved? (Think Marcuse and introjected heteronomy.)

If the poor and those suffering from mental illness, including depression, and those who are medically dependent, are given this “choice” as a legitimate medical option, how is it that social masters aren’t benefiting?

Our choices have social ramifications. Are we required or not, as citizens, to consider what effect our “choices” have on the social order?

If the legalization of our choice turns doctors into killers, is that something we are required to consider?

If the legalization of our choice commits the social body to the normalization of suicide, thereby exposing all the vulnerable, is that something we are required to consider?

If the state, and indeed insurance companies, are handed this new instrument of biopower, power that has always been abused, is that something we are required to consider?

Is such a question intrinsic to our humanity or not? Are our choices bound by solidarity, or not?

Friendship as the Othering of Self

[Originally posted on Facebook, 9 March.]

Does a person need friends to be happy?

In the last session of Massachusetts Citizens for Life's Pro-Life Social Doctrine Certificate program, we spent much of our time exploring Aristotle's chapters on friendship from the Nicomachean Ethics. I had not planned it thus, but the topic of friendship (especially as ramified into civic friendship) took hold of me as essential to our meditation on the deep conditions for a pro-life subjectivity, as well as for a rejuvenation of our Republic.

One of the many striking things about Aristotle's treatment of friendship is his way (as with his ethics as a whole) of setting it within a political context, but also within an ontological context—remembering that Aristotle's notion of happiness commits us to being more (being good), through virtuous activity. Being, being-with, being-more: friendship is essential to human development and political health.

In a particularly fascinating passage from Book IX.9, Aristotle explains the necessity of friendship for happiness with reference to what Kant would call the transcendental unity of apperception, or which we might call spirit's reflexivity. Spirit (the power to know and love, the rational power) is for communion, therefore wants communion, needs communion. Being in us wants to be more, and a friend is another self, so friendship is ingredient in the fecundity of being.

"But if life itself is good and pleasant (which it seems to be, from the very fact that all men desire it, and particularly those who are good and supremely happy; for to such men life is most desirable, and their existence is the most supremely happy) and if he who sees perceives that he sees, and he who hears, that he hears, and he who walks, that he walks, and in the case of all other activities similarly there is something which perceives that we are active, so that if we perceive, we perceive that we perceive, and if we think, that we think; and if to perceive that we perceive or think is to perceive that we exist (for existence was defined as perceiving or thinking); and if perceiving that one lives is in itself one of the things that are pleasant (for life is by nature good, and to perceive what is good present in oneself is pleasant); and if life is desirable, and particularly so for good men, because to them existence is good and pleasant for they are pleased at the consciousness of the presence in them of what is in itself good); and if as the virtuous man is to himself, he is to his friend also (for his friend is another self): if all this be true, as his own being is desirable for each man, so, or almost so, is that of his friend. Now his being was seen to be desirable because he perceived his own goodness, and such perception is pleasant in itself. He needs, therefore, to be conscious of the existence of his friend as well, and this will be realized in their living together and sharing in discussion and thought; for this is what living together would seem to mean in the case of man, and not, as in the case of cattle, feeding in the same place."

The friendly sharing of life is an exigence of the human spirit: the rational animal is the political animal. Or, the human person cannot find him or herself except in the sincere gift of self. The sentiment of existence urges towards a shared sentiment, and we know that that sentiment must come to feel as proper to itself the agonies and the joys of every other.

Our Liberty is in the Imperative to Take Care

To be free means to take care of others.

Saint Thomas Aquinas points this out in explaining how there can be a natural law, where "law" is a thing of reason (and hence free) and "nature" is a matter (at least in every other animal) of instinct (hence not free).

The solution is that a human person by his or her nature, besides being moved by instincts, is capable of questioning reality and thus of becoming more and more, by entering more deeply into the articulations of being. And becoming intimate with more of reality is expansion of soul, expansion of mind and heart: this gentles the idiosyncratic blood, and enables us to feel otherness within ourselves—so we may will the good for more than ourselves. So we may love.

As Aquinas puts it, "Wherefore, since all things subject to divine providence are ruled and measured by the eternal law, it is evident that all things partake in some way in the eternal law, namely, insofar as all things have inclinations to their own acts and ends from the eternal law's imprint on them. Now among all others, the rational creature is subject to divine providence in a more excellent way, since it also shares in God's providence, by being provident both for itself and for others." (Summa theologiae, I-II, q. 91, a. 2)

It is because our nature is free that we can receive the law (which always aims at the common good). The law is this; our freedom is this: TAKE CARE. Be a shepherd of being. Find the light in things, even when it's deeply hidden, so that love may breathe again.

There's this powerful statement from the poet René Char, a leader of the French Resistance in WWII (Fragment 111 of Hypnos): "Light has been banished from our eyes. It's buried somewhere in our bones. It's our turn now to hunt for it and put back its crown."

The liberty of the human person is to find the truth within the tears of things and thus instaurate the kingdom of responsive love.

To be provident, to take care, requires some mastery of time and space, bending materiality according to the purposes of love. And that includes taking account of the time of day.

If you are pro-life and live in Massachusetts, but haven't made it to one of Massachusetts Citizens for Life's annual conventions, now is a good time to come. It's this Saturday in Brockton: https://www.masscitizensforlife.org/2018convention.

The focus will be on the changes in the who and why of abortion. The demographics have shifted over time. As the political time of day has changed with the crisis in our elite class (and we must grapple with that), so also if we are to be provident when it comes to the lives of the most powerless human beings, we must know the facts as they are—so we may respond, be responsible, as we ought to be. In that imperative, is our freedom.

Truth: Datum, Non Factum (Given, Not Made)

[Originally posted on Facebook, 11 March.]

Wonderful discussion today on Pope Benedict's Caritas in veritate (which can be viewed in other posts). It is a breathtaking contribution to Catholic social doctrine. One of the most striking aspects of the document is the characteristically Ratzingerian move of highlighting the Augustinian emphasis on our fallen tendency to curve in on ourselves.

This hardening of the human horizon against the transcendent context of divine goodness (a way of describing secularization) causes the powers of the human soul, in their erotic striving for the true, the good, and the beautiful, to miscarry and collapse upon the self (concupiscence as moral entropy) in an autoerotic flight from otherness. This secularizing operation derails integral human development, which can only be consummated within ipsum esse subsistens. Instead, closure against the infinite horizon of God causes the powers of the human soul and of the world to stagnate, becoming poisonous, miasmic, rather than dynamic, transcendent. When the dimension of gratuity is eclipsed, there is only the concupiscence of exploitative desire. Knowing what's in ourselves, we assume that it's the same with everybody else's heart: we become fearful, and brutal in our fear: "a perpetual and restless desire of power after power" and "a war of all against all" (as Hobbes puts it).

Pope Benedict writes in no. 34 of Caritas in veritate: "Charity in truth places man before the astonishing experience of gift. Gratuitousness is present in our lives in many different forms, which often go unrecognized because of a purely consumerist and utilitarian view of life. The human being is made for gift, which expresses and makes present his transcendent dimension. Sometimes modern man is wrongly convinced that he is the sole author of himself, his life, and society. This is a presumption that follows from being selfishly closed in upon himself, and it is a consequence—to express it in faith terms—of original sin."

Truth or power: if we deny the givenness of natures (if we forget that everything is grace, a gift; if we forget to wonder at each thing, to attend to the almost-sensuous contours of each thing's intelligibility), then things (including human bodies) become manipulables and commodities. Without eyes for the luminosity of truth in each thing, there is only might making right—and the weak suffering what they must.

If the powerful are not checked by the measure of the truth of things (of natures), a zero-sum economics of scarcity will be death-dealing for the non-elite.

I'm trying to work through a provocative work by René Char, a French poet who was a leader in the Maquis, called Hypnos. In Fragment 8, he writes: "The moment the instinct for survival gives way to the instinct for possession, reasonable human beings lose all sense of their probable lifespan and day-to-day equilibrium. They grow hostile to small chills in the atmosphere and submit without further ado to whatever evil and deceit might require of them. Under a maleficent hailstorm their miserable existence simply crumbles away."

Fearful avarice (which must manage everything) destroys solidarity. It keeps us from doing what is most natural: being friendly to any fellow human, taking care, being responsible. To love the other, I must receive the other, wonder at and wait upon the other. If I am frantically building my world, there is no place for the other AS other.

Again, Pope Benedict (from no. 53): "One of the deepest forms of poverty a person can experience is isolation. If we look closely at other kinds of poverty, including material forms, we see that they are born from isolation, from not being loved, or from difficulties in being able to love. Poverty is often produced by a rejection of God's love, by man's basic and tragic tendency to close in on himself, thinking himself to be self-sufficient or merely an insignificant and ephemeral fact, a 'stranger' in a random universe. Man is alienated when he is alone, when he is detached from reality, when he refuses to think and to put faith in a foundation. All of humanity is alienated when too much trust is placed in merely human projects, ideologies, and false utopias. ...The development of peoples depends, above all, on a recognition that the human race is a single family working together in true communion, not simply a group of subjects who happen to live side by side."

Solidarity (which works the healing of alienation) requires marveling at the givenness and graciousness of truth, which as such, in every case, breathes forth love—redolent of intimacy, of tomorrow, of God.

A Catholic Approach to Modernity

Cyril O'Regan is brilliant, and his essay "The 'Gift' of Modernity" is worth reading: http://churchlife.nd.edu/2018/03/20/the-gift-of-modernity/. I am very much with him in evaluating modernity as a "gift," taken in the Derridean manner, linking the word (via German) to the Greek pharmakon—which means both cure and poison. That is exactly the status of modernity. The council fathers take this stance in Gaudium et spes. It's the catholic stance: not nostalgic, not boosterish, but discerning—and always acknowledging the true, the good, the beautiful wherever it is.

Those who take this catholic stance towards modernity O'Regan calls "shadow-seers," as opposed to the "cheerers" (e.g., Habermas) and the "weepers" (e.g., Heidegger and Alasdair MacIntyre).

O'Regan's list of theologians providing support for the "shadow-seeing" approach to modernity is almost perfect: Popes Francis and Benedict, Metz, de Lubac, Balthasar. As O'Regan notes, though, these tend somewhat towards the "weeping" side. If he had included Pope Saint John Paul II, he would have had someone in between this group and Charles Taylor.

On Francis and Benedict:

"Francis is hardly a net declaimer of modernity and shows no signs of being willing to roll back basic human rights or downplay in any way modern concerns for human dignity and justice. But as is well-known, he decries unrestricted capitalism, the catastrophic damage done to nature in and through modern economic machine and the destruction of society consequent on the acquisitive mentality spawned in and by modernity. Francis justifies weeping, but also wishes to limit it. Critique is accompanied by recommendation. What he recommends, however, is the basic kerygma of the Gospel rather than the Church or the developed theological edifices generated within the history of Christianity. While hardly despising theological construction, we find no nostalgia for premodern world of Thomistic synthesis. For Francis, the Gospel is both persuasive and light enough to carry Christians through and beyond a secular modernity. Now Benedict says many of the things that we identify Francis with, and said them before him. Yet, it is fair to say the following three things: (a) Benedict is more concerned with the identity of the Church, its authority, and its teaching; (b) While Benedict is willing to ascribe value to modernity, his critique is broader in that it includes a critique of secular culture as an ideological system that functions hegemonically and his critique cuts deeper in that he brings out the antipathy that secular modernity has for religion; its neutrality is armed; and (c) although Benedict does not think that premodern Christianity can be retrieved wholescale, he does think not only that significant elements can survive, but ought to survive under pain of nominalism."

My love for Pope Benedict runs very deep, but I do think that his negative attitude towards the Enlightenment smacks too much of the early Frankfurt School. That said, as with those latter theorists, there is so much critical-theoretical heft in Pope Benedict's work—one cannot do without it. Pope Francis tightens the screws on capitalism that Benedict had already applied in his magnificent Caritas in veritate, written in the aftermath of the Great Recession. But it belongs to the main thrust of Catholic social doctrine to try to humanize the capitalist system. What Francis does most uniquely is attempt to exorcise Catholic jingoism, an essential operation for the integrity of the true religion.

Then O'Regan highlights Johann Baptist Metz. Metz is not as widely known as he ought to be, one of my great favorites. His placing the memory of suffering and of the victims at the center of theology is necessary for resisting the bourgeoisification of Christianity. And it is necessary for cultivating a pro-life subjectivity. O'Regan's summary of his thought is outstanding:

"Metz, who is influenced by Critical Theory as much as Karl Rahner, has, over a life-time of engaged theological production, critiqued secular modernity for the way in which it fosters amnesia of how history has turned out for considerable groups of people, moral apathy regarding the claims this suffering has on us, and the ideology of endless progress that sidelines critical scrutiny of the zero-sum game of the power dynamics of history with its winners and losers. Metz provides a reflective version and justification of the shadow-seer rather than the weeper. We can see this by attending to two absences in his thought: (a) He does not absolutely decry modern reason, but condemns what he regards as its shadow-side; (b) His works illustrate no penchant for returning to a premodern legislative and clerical Church, and a theology-heavy Christian conceptuality. Crucial for the opposing of amnesia, apathy, and dispelling the vacancy of modern ideal of progress is the recall of the passion, death, and resurrection of Christ. This is restorative of the devastated subject of history; such a restoration becomes the central task of the Church founded by the essential Christian message that is at a slant to modernity and apocalyptically interruptive with respect to it."

Finally, I wish to highlight O'Regan's judicious presentation of the thought of de Lubac and Balthasar:

"Famous as nouvelle théologie theologians, in each case over the course of over fifty years of writing, de Lubac and Balthasar drew attention both to the modernity that had unwrung the integral world of the medieval period and the hapless nature of Christianity’s response and in particular that of the Catholic Church. Neither was a net weeper regarding modernity: both welcomed the greater dialogical spirit of modernity and both embraced large swathes of modern culture. But from their point of view there was much in modernity that was askew, and much that was implicitly and explicitly hostile to Christianity, and that nothing was to be gained by ignoring it. For both of them the world was both world and “world.” This meant in both cases a kind of Augustinian comportment towards the world: the world was good enough such that it should come as no surprise that one could learn and benefit from it; at the same time the world was sufficiently distorted, sufficiently “world” in the Johannine sense one should not entirely cast aside suspicion or be unaware of the prospects of being co-opted by the secular. Both de Lubac and Balthasar lent their voice to this necessary balance in the post-Conciliar age. In addition, both have a thicker view of the Church that is to be saved from modernity than that of Metz, and are far more prescriptive and normative regarding the identity of Church. This means that the survival of the Church is much more in doubt since purely accommodating forms of Church would not count. To speak to survival of the Church is to speak to the survival of a Church that has a hierarchical structure, possesses a Creed, is confident in its declaration of precept, and is concerned with justice but not afraid to speak of the afterlife. This Church also is also ecumenical and multiply inflected in terms of spirituality, since tradition represents many, even if related, takes on the fundamental mystery of the incarnation. Nothing like a return of the Neo-Patristic synthesis is imagined in the future, since its value in the past, while considerable, is also relative."

The key is indeed the difference between the (good) saeculum and its deformation by an incurvatio in se ipsum (secularization), world and "world." To demonize modernity would be an act of ideological totalization, an ironic kind of secularization. Catholicity must resist all forms of totality, without becoming idealistic and disincarnate. In de Lubac and Balthasar, we have resistance to both gnostic ecclesiologies, as well as to Catholic jingoism. It is catholic Catholics who must cultivate the good world and the goodness in this age.